



Optimal Algorithm for Max-Min Fairness Bandit

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Max-Min Fairness for Multiple Players

[Radunovic et al. 2007, Asadpour et al. 2010, Zahavi et al. 2013]

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|---|---|
| |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | | 1 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 |
|  | 1 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.5 | | 1 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.5 |
|  | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.3 | | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.3 |

- maximize total reward maybe unfair to certain player

- max-min fairness maximizes the reward of the minimal player

- Max-min matching $m^* \in \arg \max_m \min_i \mu_{i,m_i}$ with
 Max-min value $\gamma^* = \max_m \min_i \mu_{i,m_i}$ utilities

- Usually assume #players \leq #items

(Offline) Algorithm: Known Utilities $\{\mu_{i,k}\}$

- N players, K items, $N \leq K$
- Binary Search Threshold Test Algorithm [Panagiotas et al. 2023]
 - Sort $\{\mu_{i,k}\}_{i \in [N], k \in [K]}$
 - Binary search candidate max-min value γ :
 - Delete edges (i, k) with $\mu_{i,k} < \gamma$
 - Run Hungarian algorithm for max matching
 - If max matching has size N , set γ as lower bound, continue search

| | | | | |
|--|-----|-----|----------------|----------------|
| | | | | |
| | 1 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 |
| | 1 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.5 |
| | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.3 |

- Sort $\mu_{i,k}$: 1, 0.9, 0.8, 0.6, 0.5, 0.3
- Test $\gamma = 0.8$
 - Delete edges with $\mu_{i,k} < \gamma = 0.8$
 - Find max-matching of size = 3 = N **Yes!**

(Offline) Algorithm: Known Utilities $\{\mu_{i,k}\}$ 2

- N players, K items, $N \leq K$
- Binary Search Threshold Test Algorithm [Panagiotas et al. 2023]
 - Sort $\{\mu_{i,k}\}_{i \in [N], k \in [K]}$
 - Binary search candidate max-min value γ :
 - Delete edges (i, k) with $\mu_{i,k} < \gamma$
 - Run Hungarian algorithm for max matching
 - If max matching has size N , set γ as lower bound, continue search
 - Else set γ as upper bound, continue search
- Time complexity: $O(\log(NK) NK^2)$

The complexity of Hungarian algorithm is $O((N + K)NK)$. [Kuhn 1955]

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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- Sort $\mu_{i,k}$: 1, 0.9, 0.8, 0.6, 0.5, 0.3
 - Test $\gamma = 0.8$
 - Delete edges with $\mu_{i,k} < \gamma = 0.8$
 - Find max-matching of size = 3 = N **Yes!**
 - Test $\gamma = 0.9$
 - Delete edges with $\mu_{i,k} < \gamma = 0.9$
 - Find max-matching of size = 2 < N **No!**
- $\Rightarrow \gamma^* = 0.8$

Multi-Player Multi-Armed Bandit

- N players, K arms, $N \leq K$
- At round $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$:
 - Each player $i \in [N]$ selects an arm $m_i(t) \in [K]$ and observes
 - No collision: 1-subgaussian reward $X_i(t)$ with unknown mean $\mu_{i,m_i(t)}$
 - Collision: 0 reward
 - Player i cannot observe other players' actions and rewards
 - (Decentralized) Each player updates him/herself
- Objective: Minimize max-min regret:

$$R(T) = \mathbb{E} \left[T\gamma^* - \sum_{t=1}^T \min_{i \in [N]} X_i(t) \right]$$

Existing Results

| | Regret Type | Regret Bound |
|------------------------------|-------------|--|
| Bistritz et al. ICML 2020 | Upper Bound | $O(\exp(NK) \log T \log \log T + \exp \frac{1}{\Delta_1})$ |
| | Lower Bound | $\Omega\left(\frac{\log T}{\Delta}\right)$ |
| Leshem. ICASSP 2025 | Upper Bound | $O(N^2 K \log T \log \log T + \exp \frac{1}{\Delta_1})$ |

} huge gap!


$\Delta_1 := \min_{i,i',k,k'} |\mu_{i,k} - \mu_{i',k'}|$: minimum gap among **all** (i, k) pairs (require all pairs are **distinct**)

$\Delta := \min_{(i,k): \mu_{i,k} < \gamma^*} (\gamma^* - \mu_{i,k})$: minimum gap between max-min value and **sub-optimal** pair

Problem Hardness? Lower Bound

- Each sub-optimal pair (i, k) needs to be explored sufficient $\Omega\left(\frac{\log T}{\Delta^2}\right)$ times
- But each round can explore multiple ($\leq N$) pairs with a matching
- There are NK pairs in total
- What is the problem hardness for the coefficient in front of $\Omega\left(\frac{\log T}{\Delta^2}\right)$?
 - NK or N^2 or K ?
- Can we design hard instance?

Lower Bound - Instance Design



- Increasing any pair in Gray-Box would change m^* and γ^*
- \Rightarrow Each pair needs to explore $N_{i,k} \geq \Omega\left(\frac{\log T}{\Delta^2}\right)$
- Key Observation: $\exists O(N^2)$ pairs in Gray-Box, use this to prove coefficient of $O(N^2)$

Lower Bound Proof

- $$\text{Regret} = \mathbb{E} \left[T\gamma^* - \sum_{t=1}^T \min_{i \in [N]} X_i(t) \right]$$

$$= \Delta \cdot \mathbb{E} \left[\underbrace{\sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{I} \left\{ \min_i \mu_{i, m_i(t)} = 1/2 \right\}}_{N_1} \right] + \gamma^* \cdot \mathbb{E} \left[\underbrace{\sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{I} \left\{ \min_i \mu_{i, m_i(t)} = 0 \right\}}_{N_2} \right]$$


suboptimal matching without selecting 0-pair

- Claim: Without selecting 0-pair, at most one pair in Gray-Box will be selected

- $N_1 = \#\{\text{one } 1/2\text{-pair is selected and no } 0\text{-pair}\}$
- $N_2 = \#\{\text{0-pair is selected}\} \Rightarrow \text{at most } N \text{ } 1/2\text{-pair is selected}$
- $$\Omega\left(\frac{N^2 \log T}{\Delta^2}\right) = \sum_{i \in (N/2, N]} \sum_{k \in [1, N/2]} N_{i,k} \leq N_1 + N \cdot N_2$$


$$\leq N_1 + \frac{\gamma^*}{\Delta} \cdot N_2 = \text{Regret} / \Delta$$
- $\Rightarrow \text{Regret} = \Omega\left(\frac{N^2 \log T}{\Delta}\right)$

$\Delta \leq \gamma^* / N$



Lower Bound Proof 2

- \forall pair (N, k) with $k > N$, increasing its value changes m^* and γ^*
- Each such pair needs to explore $\Omega\left(\frac{\log T}{\Delta^2}\right)$ times
- Each round explores at most one such pair $\Rightarrow \Omega\left(\frac{(K-N) \log T}{\Delta}\right)$ regret



Lower Bound

- **Theorem (Lower Bound)** N players, K arms, time horizon T ,
 \exists an instance with $\Delta \leq \gamma^*/N$, s.t. any uniformly consistent algorithm satisfies the max-min regret


$$R(T) \geq \Omega\left(\frac{\max\{N^2, K\} \log T}{\Delta}\right)$$

Online Algorithm: Decentralized Fair Elimination

- Phased-based exploration
- At each phase s :
 - **Exploration** s.t. each remaining pair is selected for 2^s times
 - Players communicate their statistics: $\{\hat{\mu}_{i,k}, N_{i,k}\}_{i,k}$
 - **Eliminate** unnecessary pairs

Online Algorithm: Exploration

- Begin w/ any candidate matching m using remaining pairs
 - Such a matching must exist if only sub-optimal pairs are deleted
- Denote arms in m as **candidate** arms



Online Algorithm: Elimination

- For (i, k) , $UCB_{i,k}(t) = \hat{\mu}_{i,k}(t) + c \sqrt{\frac{\log T}{N_{i,k}(t)}}$, $LCB_{i,k}(t) = \hat{\mu}_{i,k}(t) - c \sqrt{\frac{\log T}{N_{i,k}(t)}}$
- Compute max-min value γ_{LCB} using $LCB_{i,k}$

- $\Rightarrow \gamma_{LCB} \leq \gamma^*$ w.h.p.

- Eliminate pairs (i, k) if

- $UCB_{i,k} < \gamma_{LCB}$, or
- (i, k) cannot form a matching

(i, k) will be eliminated
when $N_{i,k} \geq \frac{\log T}{(\Delta_{i,k}/2)^2}$

before phase s : $2^s \geq \frac{\log T}{(\Delta_{i,k}/2)^2}$

- Regret in phase $s \leq (N^2 + K)2^s \cdot \max_{(i,k) \in \text{Phase } s} \Delta_{i,k} \leq O\left((N^2 + K)2^s \cdot \sqrt{\frac{\log T}{2^s}}\right)$

- Regret $\leq O\left((N^2 + K) \sum_s \sqrt{2^s \log T}\right) \leq O\left((N^2 + K) \frac{\log T}{\Delta}\right)$

$s_{\max} \leq O\left(\log \frac{\log T}{\Delta^2}\right)$

Online Algorithm: Regret

- **Theorem (Upper Bound)** N players, K arms, time horizon T . The max-min regret of the *Decentralized Fair Elimination* algorithm satisfies

$$R(T) \leq O\left(\frac{(N^2 + K) \log T}{\Delta} + C_{\text{comm}} \log T\right)$$

phase will go on if m^* is not unique

Result

| | Regret Type | Regret Bound |
|------------------------------|------------------------|--|
| Bistritz et al. ICML 2020 | Upper Bound | $O(\exp(NK) \log T \log \log T + \exp \frac{1}{\Delta_1})$ |
| | Lower Bound | $\Omega\left(\frac{\log T}{\Delta}\right)$ |
| Leshem. ICASSP 2025 | Upper Bound | $O(N^2 K \log T \log \log T + \exp \frac{1}{\Delta_1})$ |
| Our Work | Upper / Lower Bound | $\Theta\left((N^2 + K) \frac{\log T}{\Delta}\right)$ |

Close the gap!

$\Delta_1 := \min_{i,i',k,k'} |\mu_{i,k} - \mu_{i',k'}|$: minimum gap among **all** (i, k) pairs (require all pairs are **distinct**)

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Conclusion

- Lower bound: Design worst case instance
- Upper bound: Propose optimal exploration assignment strategy
- Future Direction:
 - Strategy-proof of players
 - Robustness against attacker
 - Extend the analysis to other notions of fairness, e.g., envy-freeness [Gamow et al. 1958] and proportionality [Steinhaus 1948]



Thanks!
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Questions?

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